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BANKRUPTCY-PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE-THE PROPERTY OF
THE ESTATE CONTINUES TO EXIST AFTER CONFIRMATION OF THE
CHAPTER 13 PLAN. Security Bank of Marshalltown v. Neiman, I
F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code provides eligible debtors
with an alternative to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation by pro-
viding an opportunity for them to restructure their debts and repay
their obligations within a specified time period with court supervision
and protection.' The bankruptcy court, in a Chapter 13 proceeding,
will approve a plan which provides for the payment of creditors
and which the debtor must successfully complete in order to be
rehabilitated. 2 An estate is created when the debtor files a Chapter
13 petition.3 The estate includes the assets of the debtor at the time
of the filing as well as future earnings. 4 All assets of the estate are
pledged to satisfy the current creditors.5 Sometimes, however, debtors
have unexpected expenses and find that they must incur additional
debts after the plan has been confirmed. How easily a creditor who
loans funds to the debtor after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan
can be repaid raises the issue of whether the estate of a Chapter
13 debtor continues to exist after confirmation of the plan by the
bankruptcy court. The district and bankruptcy courts have been
deeply divided on this issue, giving rise to contrary interpretations
of the bankruptcy statutes. 6 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
one of the first circuit courts to address this issue, held in a recent
decision that the estate continued to exist after the confirmation of
the plan, thereby providing predictability in resolving this conflict. 7
II. FACTS AND CASE HISTORY
Robert and Susan Brown (hereinafter the "Browns") filed a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988). See generally Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5798; David Hardy, Conversion
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code: What Constitutes Property
of the Post-Conversion Estate, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1105, 1111 (1992).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322, 1325 (1988). See also Hardy, supra note 1, at
1112.
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 1306 (1988).
4. Id.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1988). See also Hardy, supra note 1, at 1112-13.
6. See Michaela M. White, The Effects of Chapter 13 Plan Confirmation and
Case Conversion on Property, 26 CRFiGHToN L. R.Ev. 785 (1993).
7. Security Bank of Marshalltown v. Neiman, 1 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1993).
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Court for the Southern District of Iowa on December 27, 1982.1
The debtors were farmers engaged primarily in the raising and selling
of hogs. 9 The Chapter 13 plan divided the debt owed to the Security
Bank of Marshalltown (hereinafter "Security Bank") into secured
and unsecured portions. 0 The Browns satisfied the secured portion
of the claim under the plan, and the appellant released its lien on
the debtors' assets."
The Browns were allowed to continue to farm during the pen-
dency of the Chapter 13 proceeding. 2 As a result, the Browns
incurred additional debts that were primarily for feed and veterinary
services for the preservation of their hog herd. 3 Later, after the
removal of Security Bank's lien, the Browns sold the hogs and
applied the money toward some of their post-petition debts. 4 The
Browns then converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding." To
recover payments made to the post-petition creditors as preferential
transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), the Chapter 7 trustee brought
adversarial proceedings against the creditors.16 The bankruptcy court
held that the trustee could not avoid the transfers based on the
exception under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) and allowed the payments to
remain with the post-petition creditors.
7
8. Id. at 688.
9. Id.
10. Id. The total debt owed to the bank was $323,645.52. The secured portion
of the claim was set at $168,840.01 to be paid over 3 years, and the unsecured
portion, $154,805.51, was to be paid at the same rate as other unsecured creditors:
$.445 on the dollar. Id.
11. Id. The collateral for the secured portion of the debt primarily consisted
of the debtors' hog herd. Id. The secured creditor objected to the release of the
lien but complied with the bankruptcy court order which stated that the release
was necessary to protect all unsecured creditors if the debtors converted to a Chapter
7 bankruptcy proceeding. In Re Brown, No. 82-1857-C, slip op. 3, 6 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa Oct. 7, i986).
12. 1 F.3d at 688.
13. Id. at 688, 691.
14. Id. at 688.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Neiman v. Brown, No. 87-0109 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa, filed Nov.
7, 1988)). 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) provides that a trustee may avoid any transfer, except
for those provided in subsection (c), of an interest of the debtor in property where
it was made: (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for an antecedent debt
owed; (3) while the debtor was insolvent; (4) within 90 days of the filing of the
petition, or within one year if the debtor was an insider; (5) and where the creditor
would receive more than if the case was under chapter 7, the transfer had not
been made and payment was received pursuant to the provisions of Title 11.
17. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) provides for an exception to the general rule under
§ 547(b) which allow trustee to avoid transfers under the listed grounds. See supra
note 16. Section 547(c)(2), which is applicable here, states in pertinent part that
a trustee may not avoid a transfer under this section to the extent that such transfer
was made in the ordinary course of business. Id.
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Unable to recover the amounts paid by the Browns to their
post-petition creditors, the trustee was then left with $43,000.00 with
which he proposed to pay Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 administrative
fees and expenses.' The fees and expenses included payments to
creditors for expenses incurred in order to preserve the estate under
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).19 Security Bank objected to the trustee's
proposal, arguing that the costs and expenses sought for payments
were not needed to preserve the estate because the estate no longer
existed after the Chapter 13 plan was approved. 20 The bankruptcy
court found that the estate continued to exist beyond confirmation
of the Chapter 13 plan. 2' The court allowed the payments to the
post-petition creditors as expenses necessary for the preservation of
the estate. 22 The appellant appealed to the district court, the district
court affirmed the bankruptcy court decision, and an appeal to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ensued.
23
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Congress derives its power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws
from the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8. 24 Early
bankruptcy laws favored creditors by ensuring equal division of the
18. 1 F.3d at 688-89. Administrative expenses have a higher priority than
unsecured claims under 11 U.S.C. § 507. The first claims that will be paid in a
bankruptcy proceeding are administrative expenses allowed under § 503(b)(l)(A) for
"actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages,
salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case."
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988). Thereafter, the unsecured claims will be satisfied
with any remaining assets. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
19. 1 F.3d at 689. Actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate
will be allowed after notice and a hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1988).
20. 1 F.3d at 689 (citing Brown, slip op., at 6). The appellant argued that
under a Chapter 13 proceeding, once the plan is confirmed the estate ceases to
exist and therefore costs and expenses are not necessary to preserve something
which does not exist. The appellant did not argue in the alternative that, assuming
the existence of the estate, the expenses were not necessary for the preservation
thereof. Id. at 689.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The case was heard before Circuit Judges McMillian and Beam, and
Honorable Howard F. Sachs, Senior United States District Judge for the Western
District of Missouri, sitting by designation. Id. at 688.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The clause provides that the Congress shall
have the power "[tlo establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Id.
1994]
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debtor's property among those to whom he owed money. 25 In an
attempt to alleviate some of the harshness of the creditor-favored
bankruptcy and to provide a balance between the conflicting interests
of debtors and creditors, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of
1898.26 The Act was subsequently amended by the Chandler Act of
1938 and eventually repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978.27 The Bankruptcy Reform Act, which is still in effect today,
is comprised of eight separate chapters.
28
Chapter 13 is a very desirable alternative for individuals who
are able to make regular payments on their debts because it avoids
a liquidation under a Chapter 7 proceeding. 29 There is preference
for a Chapter 13 proceeding over the Chapter 7 alternative because
the former seems to benefit both debtors and creditors .30 A Chapter
13 case commences with the filing of a petition under that chapter, 3'
and the estate of the debtor is created from the debtor's assets.
32
25. Hardy, supra note 1, at 1107.
26. Hardy, supra note 1, at 1108.
27. Hardy, supra note 1, at 1108.
28. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988). The Bankruptcy Code is comprised of Chapters
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, and 13. Chapter 1 includes general provisions, such as
definitions, which are applicable to all the chapters. Chapter 3 provides for case
administration also applicable to all the chapters, and Chapter 5 includes provisions
regarding the creditors, debtor, and the estate. Chapter 7 is the operative chapter
on liquidation. The trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding will provide for
the liquidation of all the debtor's non-exempt estate property and distribute the
proceeds to the creditors. Chapter 9 provides for the adjustment of debts of a
municipality. Chapter 11 is the reorganization chapter available to businesses,
Chapter 12 provides for the adjustment of debts of family farmers who have
regular annual income, and Chapter 13 provides for the adjustment of debts of
an individual with regular income. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 301, 501, 701, 901, 1101,
1201, 1301 (1988). See also Hardy, supra note 1, at 1108-09.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988). Relief under Chapter 13 can only be sought by
individuals who have rcguiar income and who owe on the date of filing non-
contingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and non-contingent,
liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000. Id.
30. Robert J. Volpi, Property of the Bankruptcy Estate after a Conversion
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7: The Need for a Definite Answer, 68 IND. L.J.
489, 490 (1993). The reason all parties prefer a Chapter 13 option is because both
the debtors, creditors, and public interest will benefit from a Chapter 13 reorgan-
ization over a Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. The debtors can repay their debts while
remaining in control and possession of their property, and if the terms of the plan
are met, it ensures the debtor a fresh start. Id. Creditors will also, in most instances,
receive a larger percentage of their claims under the Chapter 13 plan than under
a one time liquidation procedure, even though it may take longer to receive payments.
Id.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). This section provides that a voluntary case is
commenced by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court. The commencement of
the case will provide for relief afforded under the appropriate chapter. Id.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988).
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The property that comprises a Chapter 13 estate is defined by 11
U.S.C. § 541 and 11 U.S.C. § 1306. Under these sections, property
of the estate not only encompasses the debtor's property at the time
of the filing, but also includes property acquired after the com-
mencement of the case.3 Under Chapter 13, the debtor may remain
in possession of the property of the estate unless otherwise provided
by the plan.34 A standing trustee is appointed under a Chapter 13
case to advise and assist the debtor in the performance of the plan.
35
Periodic payments are made by the debtor to the trustee who in
turn distributes the funds to the creditors as provided by the Chapter
13 plan.1
6
Chapter 13, available since the Chandler Bankruptcy Act of
1938, has been very difficult to understand, and it has created more
inconsistent results among jurisdictions than any other federal statute.37
The new Chapter 13, created under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, undertook to solve many of the existing problems and to
provide for an effective system for individuals to pay their debts
under court protection and supervision.38 Inconsistent results among
jurisdictions, however, continue to exist regarding the interpretation
of 11 U.S.C. § 1306 and 11 U.S.C. § 1327.
39
33. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 1306 (1988). Aside from some exceptions listed under
subsections (b) and (c) of § 541, the estate is comprised of virtually all of the
debtor's legal or equitable property interests as of the commencement of the case
in addition to property acquired after the commencement of the case under § 1306.
Id.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (1988). Section 1306(b) states that "[ejxcept as provided
in a confirmed plan or order confirming a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession
of all property of the estate." Id.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988). The duties of the standing trustee are those specified
under §§ 704(2)-(9): to appear at any hearing concerning the value of property
subject to a lien, confirmation of the plan, or modification of the plan post-
confirmation; to dispose of moneys received; to advise and assist the debtor in
performance of the plan; and to ensure that the debtor commences making timely
payments under the plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(2)-(9) (1988).
36. Chapter 13 requires the filing of a plan under § 1321. The plan will provide
for full payment of all claims entitled to priority under § 507 and the plan may
provide for payments of unsecured claims which in most instances will be less than
their full value. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1988). The court must confirm the plan as
required under § 1325. Confirmation of the plan will result as long as it complies
with the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988), including the requirement that it
be made in good faith.
37. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5798.
38. Id. at 5799.
39. White, supra note 6, at 785. In her article, Professor White examined the
deeply divided status of the property of the estate after the Chapter 13 plan is
confirmed as well as the equally divided status of what constitutes property of the
estate when the Chapter 13 case is converted to a Chapter 7 case.
1994]
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The disagreement over whether the property of the estate con-
tinues to exist after the Chapter 13 plan is confirmed arises from
the courts' attempts to interpret sections 1306 and 1327(b) together.4
Section 1306 seems to indicate that property of the estate includes
all of the debtor's property acquired after commencement of the
case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted. 4' Section
1327(b), on the other hand, states that unless otherwise provided
under the plan, the confirmation of the plan vests all of the property
of the estate in the debtor.42 Professor White43 classified the property
of the estate at issue under three different categories." First, there
is the pre-petition property, which is property owned by the debtor
at the time the Chapter 13 case is commenced. 4 Second, there is
post-petition property, which refers to property acquired by the
debtor after the Chapter 13 case is commenced but before confir-
mation of the plan, and at the same time this term also refers to
property acquired after confirmation."6 Finally, the term post-con-
firmation property describes all three types of property: property
owned before filing, that acquired before confirmation of the plan,
and property acquired after confirmation of the plan. 47 Ordinarily,
what constitutes property of the estate after confirmation of the
Chapter 13 plan will not concern the pre-petition creditors because
these creditors cannot take any action against the debtor pursuant
to the automatic stay" and section 1327(a). 49 The status of the
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (1988). The section provides: "Except as otherwise
provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan
vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor." Id.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (1988).
43. White, supra note 6, at 789.
44. White, supra note 6, at 789.
45. White, supra note 6, at 789.
46. White, supra note 6, at 789.
47. White, supra note 6, at 789.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). Section 362 provides for an automatic stay which
prevents creditors from enforcing claims through the judicial or administrative
process against the debtor or against the property of the estate. Id. Therefore, it
is important to determine whether property remains part of the estate for which
the stay would be applicable.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (1988). This section provides that the confirmed plan
will bind the debtor and each creditor whether or not the creditor is included in
the plan, or has objected, accepted, or rejected the plan. Id. See also White, supra
note 6, at 791. Some pre-petition creditors, however, have successfully argued that
if the debtor defaults under the plan, they should be able to take immediate action
against the debtor without first obtaining permission from the bankruptcy court.
This argument is premised on the assumption that pre-petition claims become post-
petition claims upon confirmation of the plan, and if property of the estate ceases
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property of the estate after the confirmation of the plan, however,
does concern the post-confirmation creditors. 50 Post-confirmation
creditors will not favor a determination that property of the estate
continues to exist after confirmation of the plan because their ability
to collect their claims will then be limited to seeking relief from
the automatic stay or from voluntary cooperation from the debtor.5
A survey of the cases that address the issue of whether the
property of the estate continues to exist beyond confirmation of the
plan suggests there are three recurring interpretations which courts
have chosen to follow. Prior to Neiman, most cases that dealt with
this issue examined it from the standpoint of whether the automatic
stay afforded under the bankruptcy proceeding applied after the
confirmation of the plan.
5 2
Option 1: Property of the estate ceases to exist after
confirmation of the plan.
Courts that follow this alternative interpret the two sections to
mean that property of the estate ceases to exist upon confirmation
of the Chapter 13 plan. The courts in these cases tend to give more
weight to section 1327.13 One of the most often cited cases that
stands for this proposition is In re Mason.M In that case, after the
confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan by the bankruptcy court, the
debtor became indebted to a creditor. 5 The creditor obtained a
judgment against the debtor and sought to enforce the judgment
to exist upon confirmation of the plan, the automatic stay is no longer applicable
to the creditor. White, supra note 6, at 791 (citing In re Nicholson, 70 B.R. 398
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1987)). The majority of courts have rejected this argument and
hold that the pre-petition creditor must seek relief through the bankruptcy court
upon default under the plan, or alternatively move for dismissal or conversion of
the case. Id. at 792 (citing Littke v. Trustcorp Mortgage Co., 105 B.R. 905, 909-
11 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989)).
50. White, supra note 6, at 797-98. The automatic stay provision precludes any
actions against property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
51. White, supra note 6, at 798. Section 362(d) provides that on request of an
interested party and upon a showing of cause, the court may grant relief from
the stay by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning the stay. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d) (1988).
52. 1 F.3d at 690.
53. In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990). The Petruccelli court
held that property of the estate ceased to exist post-confirmation of the Chapter
13 plan based on the following analysis. First, the court held that the basic doctrine
of statutory construction, which provides that when two statutes are in conflict
the more specific statute controls over the general one, applied here. Id. at 15.
The court found that § 1327(b) was more specific than § 1306 and therefore it was
the one to control under these circumstances. Id.
54. 45 B.R. 498 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984), aff'd In re Mason, 51 B.R. 548 (Bankr.
D.C. Or. 1985). See also White, supra note 6, at 799.
55. 45 B.R. at 499.
1994]
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by garnishing the debtor's wages.56 The debtor filed an action to
recover the funds, arguing that the creditor had violated the automatic
stay.5 7 Resolution of the issue of whether the automatic stay was
violated depended on the court's interpretation of the status of
property of the estate after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan. 8
The court held that upon confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan,
property of the estate revested in the debtor.5 9 This not only meant
that possession was in the debtor, but that title vested with the
debtor as well.6 Therefore, the post-confirmation creditors could
deal with the debtor as if no bankruptcy case existed. 6' The court
stated that this interpretation was the only logical result, because it
would otherwise be very difficult for the debtor to obtain post-
confirmation credit throughout the pendency of the Chapter 13
bankruptcy case.62 The court made the distinction between the right
to possession and the ownership of the property. 6 The court held
that because the Chapter 13 plan in this case required that the debtor
not incur any additional debt without the permission of the trustee,
this result was not undesirable.64 If an unexpected need to incur
debt arises, the debtor should seek modification of the plan under
section 1329.65 This provided for an equitable result for post-petition
creditors, who, unlike pre-petition creditors, have no opportunity to
object to the plan. 6
Option II: Only property that is not used to fund the Chapter
13 Plan will revest in the debtor and will not be part of the
Chapter 13 estate.
Many courts have chosen to take a middle-of-the-road approach
and interpret these statutes to mean that the property used to fund
56. Id. The creditor garnished the debtor's wages and obtained approximately
.DuL. A".
57. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).




62. Id. The court further reasoned that unless the order confirming the plan
provides otherwise, the debtor's right to control the property is the same as if the
bankruptcy had never been filed. Id.
63. Id. at 500-01. Prior to confirmation, the court stated, the debtor has a
right of possession in the property of the estate, and upon confirmation the property
vests in the debtor. Id.
64. Id. at 501.
65. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) provides that the plan may be modified upon request
by the debtor, trustee, or holder of an allowed unsecured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)
(1988).
66. In re Mason 45 B.R. 498, 501 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984), aff'd In re Mason,
51 B.R. 548 (Bankr. D.C. Or. 1985).
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the Chapter 13 plan will remain property of the estate after
confirmation. However, any other property will revest in the debtor
and will not be included in the estate. 67 Some courts favor this
approach because it provides for the equitable treatment of debtors
and creditors6 If bankruptcy courts are courts of equity with broad
remedial powers, they should not limit themselves to the language
of the statutes.6 9 Rather, the bankruptcy courts should look at the
facts of each case and base their decisions on fairness to both
creditors and debtors.7°
In the Adams case, which followed this approach, the debtor's
former spouse, after confirmation of the plan, sought to enforce a
judgment for past due alimony and child support. 7' The court
67. In re Root, 61 B.R. 984 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); In re Adams, 12 B.R.
540 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). The Root court stated that if no estate existed after
confirmation of the plan, the trustee could not fulfill his duty to administer the
estate. 61 B.R. at 985. Therefore, the court concluded that an estate consisting of
the debtor's property dedicated to the fulfillment of the plan continued to exist
post-confirmation. Id. See also In re Markowicz, 150 B.R. 461 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1993); In re Ziegler, 136 B.R. 497 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1992); In re Schewe, 94 B.R.
938 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989); In re Clark, 71 B.R. 747 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
The court, in looking at §§ 1306 and 1327, found policy reasons to support the
two possible interpretations of what happens to property of the estate after con-
firmation. 71 B.R. at 749-50. The court stated that if Congress intended for the
property of the estate to cease upon confirmation it would simply have said so.
Id. The relief to the creditor was granted by the court by allowing the debtor,
pursuant to § 1329(a), to amend the claim to be included under the plan. Id. at
751.
68. Volpi, supra note 30, at 509. See also Vicki L. Vaska, Note, Property of
the Estate After Confirmation of a Chapter 13 Repayment Plan: Balancing Com-
peting Interests, 65 WAsH. L. Rnv. 677, 686 (1990). A Michigan bankruptcy court
addressed the competing policy considerations of preserving the rights of creditors
while protecting the debtor's rehabilitation. In re Schewe, 94 B.R. 938 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1989). In this case, the court found in favor of the debtor, stating
that the debtor would suffer substantial harm if forced to relocate without the
opportunity of contesting the facts and legal issues in the bankruptcy court. Id.
at 950. The Schewe analysis balanced the competing interests of the debtor and
the post-confirmation creditor. Vaska, supra, at 686-87.
69. Vaska, supra note 68, at 688.
70. Vaska, supra note 68, at 687-88. Ms. Vaska argues that if the bankruptcy
estate is limited to that which existed at the time of the filing of the Chapter 13
estate, then it will harm both pre-petition and post-petition creditors. Pre-petition
creditors will bear the risk that the value of the estate will diminish during the
course of the plan, which may last as long as five years. In addition, prejudice
will result to post-petition creditors by denying them an interest in assets they relied
upon to extend credit. Id.
71. In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 541 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). Alimony and child
support debts are non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(5). 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
Section 523(a)(5) provides that a discharge under 1328(b) does not discharge the
1994]
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distinguished between property of the debtor and property of the
estate after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan.7 2 The court held
that in order to find an equitable balance between the debtor's
rehabilitation needs and his dependent's need for support, such a
distinction was necessary. 73 Property not designated to the fulfillment
of the plan would revest in the debtor upon confirmation and remain
property of the debtor subject to the reach of the debtor's ex-
spouse. 74 The debtor's ex-spouse, in this case, could proceed to
collect against the debtor's wages. 75 However, the ex-spouse could
only proceed against the wages of the debtor that were in excess
of the payments to the trustee under the plan, against any exempt
property and not used to fund the plan, and against any other
property retained by the debtor that was not necessary to the fulfillment
of the plan.7
6
Option III: The estate continues to exist after confirmation of
the Chapter 13 plan.
In the third line of cases, courts have chosen to follow the
alternative that the estate continues to exist after confirmation of
the Chapter 13 plan.7 7 These courts give more weight to section
1306(a)(1), which provides that the property of the estate consists
of all property acquired after the commencement of the case but
before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted.
78
In the Aneiro case, the movant sought relief from the stay so
that he could proceed to enforce a lease executed by the debtor.
79
The court held that cases which find that the estate ceases to exist
debtor from any alimony or child support debts. Id. After the confirmation of
the plan the court may grant a discharge although the debtor has not completed
the pian. Id. § 1328(b) (1988).
72. 12 B.R. at 541.
73. Id. at 542.
74. Id. (stating that any property designated to fund the Chapter 13 plan would
remain property of the estate, even though exemption of such property was possible).
11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(8) makes it possible for a debtor to fund the Chapter 13 plan
with property which can be exempt. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(8) (1988). For this reason,
it becomes necessary in a Chapter 13 case to prohibit a spouse "from proceeding
to collect until at least a plan is proposed, and the distinction between what is
property of the debtor, by virtue of his claimed exemptions, and what is property
of the estate has been clearly drawn." 12 B.R. at 543.
75. 12 B.R. at 543.
76. Id. (stating that a better way to handle these types of claims would be to
include them in the plan and rely on the trustee to monitor the payments).
77. In re Price, 130 B.R. 259 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The district court held that
[Vol. 16:297
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upon confirmation of the plan mistakenly assume that revesting
under section 1327(b) transforms the property of the estate into
property of the debtor.8 0 The court interpreted the language of section
1306 to mean that confirmation of the plan is irrelevant in determining
whether property constitutes property of the estate. 8' In reconciling
sections 1306 and 1327, the court stated that mere revesting upon
confirmation does not transform the property into property of the
debtor.82 Rather, the revested property continues to be property of
the estate and is subject to all the protection afforded by section
362(a) .83
IV. ANALYSIS
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Neiman that the
estate continues to exist following confirmation. 84 The court rec-
ognized the split of authority regarding this issue and agreed that
neither section 1306 nor section 1327 were models of clarity.8 5 Security
property of the estate continues to exist post-confirmation. Id. at 269. The court
focused on § 1306(a)(1) and held that the debtor's property became property of
the estate so long as the debtor acquired it before the case was closed, dismissed,
or converted. Id. at 270. See also In re Henry, 143 B.R. 811 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1992); In re Aneiro, 72 B.R. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987). The Henry court rejected
the argument by the creditor that any earnings not used to fund the Chapter 13
plan should not be considered part of the estate and therefore protected by the
automatic stay. 143 B.R. at 814. The court stated that the debtor's future earnings
were part of the estate and not subject to attachment until the case was either
closed or converted. Id. This was necessary, the court held, in order to ensure
successful reorganization under a Chapter 13 case. Id.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (1988).
79. 72 B.R. at 425. Aneiro filed a Chapter_13 petition and the court confirmed
the plan. The issue was whether Aneiro could modify a lease without the court's
approval. Id. at 428. Determination of whether the property of the estate existed
post-confirmation was necessary to determine whether court approval of the debtor's
need for the attempted modification of the lease was required. Id. at 428-29.
80. Id. at 428-29. The court also believed that had Congress intended for the
confirmation of the plan to "so drastically affect the expansive definition of property
of the estate found in § 1306, it knew how to draft such a provision." Id. at 429.
81. Id. at 429.
82. Id. The court stated that the language of § 1306 is clear and found the
relevant event not to be the confirmation of the plan, but rather the dismissal,
closing, or conversion of the case. Id.
83. Id. The court also stated that even though the debtor possesses and owns
the property of the estate, he cannot do with it as he pleases. Id. at 429. The
trustee must provide supervision and control over the property that is committed
to the fulfillment of the plan pursuant to § 1322(a)(1). Id.
84. Security Bank of Marshalltown v. Neiman, 1 F.3d at 687, 690 (1993).
85. Id. at 689. The court noted the tension between § 1327 and § 1306, which
provides that property of the estate encompasses all property acquired after the
filing of the Chapter 13 case but before it is closed, dismissed, or converted. On
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Bank argued that the court should find that the Chapter 13 estate
ceased to exist upon confirmation of the plan.16 Security Bank claimed
that this was the better-reasoned position and that any other inter-
pretation would render section 1327(b) meaningless.8 7 Based on this
argument, no estate existed, and the post-petition debts would not
qualify as administrative expenses entitled to priority., The trustee,
conversely, argued that the bankruptcy court properly followed the
line of cases which held that the estate continues to exist upon
confirmation of the plan.89 Therefore, as long as the estate continues
to exist, administrative expenses incurred to preserve the estate are
accorded priority.90 To hold otherwise, the trustee argued, would
create an inequitable result since it would prevent payment to post-
petition creditors who extended credit to debtors attempting to keep
their businesses going. 9'
The court examined cases which addressed this issue and con-
cluded that most cases dealt with whether the automatic stay remained
in effect following confirmation. 92 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals distinguished In re Adams from the present case. 93 In Adams,
post-confirmation assets consisted of property of the estate if they
were dedicated to fulfillment of the plan or as property of the debtor
if not dedicated to fulfillment of the planY4 The issue in the case
was which assets were included in the estate, and which assets were,
therefore, protected by the stay. 9 Here, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated that the issue involved in this case is simply
whether the estate continues to exist post-confirmation.9
the other hand, § 1327 provides for the vesting of all the property of the estate
upon confirmation of the plan. The court found that different interpretations of






91. Id. at 689-90.
92. Id. at 690 (citing In re Clark, 71 B.R. 747 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re
Adams, 12 B.R. 540 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)).
93. Id. at 690.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court discussed the fact that this issue was once presented to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in another case, Laughlin v. IRS, 912 F.2d 197
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 (1991), but the court resolved that
case without having to address this particular issue. However, the dissenter in that
case, Judge Magill, addressed the issue, finding the cases which follow the position




The court found the line of cases which hold that the estate
continues to exist after confirmation of the plan more persuasive.
97
The court reasoned that even if 11 U.S.C. § 1327 has the effect of
vesting property of the estate in the debtor upon confirmation, it
does not necessarily mean the estate ceases to exist. 98 The court also
indicated that even though the estate holds no property, it may
continue to exist as a legal entity post-confirmation.9 The court
sustained the view that the estate does not cease to exist after
confirmation through the application of several other bankruptcy
statutes.' °° The trustee must supervise and control monies and prop-
erty of the estate committed to the plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(a)(1).101 Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 345, the trustee may invest
or deposit money of the estate. 0 2 The trustee is also authorized to
stop payment on unpaid checks ninety days after final distribution,
paying the remainder of the property of the estate into the court
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 347(a). 03 A final report and the filing of
a final account regarding the administration of the estate must be
made by the trustee as required under 11 U.S.C. § 704(9).1°4 Finally,
under 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3), unless otherwise provided by court
order, dismissal of the Chapter 13 case "revests the property of the
estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately
before the commencement of the case."'' 0 The court indicated that
all of these sections support the position that the estate continues
to exist following confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan.' °6
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also agreed that if Congress
had intended that the property of the estate cease to exist upon
confirmation, it would have drafted such a provision.1' 7 The court




101. Id. Section 1322(a)(1) provides that the plan must "provide for the submission
of all or such portion of future earnings or other future income of the debtor to
the supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the
plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1988).
102. 1 F.3d at 690.
103. Id. at 690-91.
104. Id. at 691. Section 704(9) is made applicable to a Chapter 13 case through
11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1). Id.
105. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) (1988)).
106. Id. at 691. The court then quoted from the Root case, which provided that
"[i]f there is no existing estate upon confirmation, then what does the Chapter
13 Trustee administer? If there is no estate over which the Chapter 13 Trustee has
control, then that Trustee is nothing more than an officious intermeddler ......
Id. (quoting In re Root, 61 B.R. 984, 985 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986)).




sustained this position by arguing that Congress did intend such a
result under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding.'08 Under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(b), confirmation of the plan vests all property of the estate
in the debtor;109 however, confirmation also acts as a discharge of
the case, thereby ending the automatic stay provision." 0 The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided that this was not the effect provided
for under confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan."'
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, therefore, held that the
estate continues to exist after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan.
1 2
Since the post-petition debts in this case were for feed and veterinary
services incurred to preserve the Browns' hog herd, they constituted
administrative expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business
and were entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)." 3
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in favor
of the estate's continuing existence after confirmation of the Chapter
13 plan is significant for several reasons. First, the decision eliminated
speculation over the interpretation of this issue and provided uni-
formity among jurisdictions within the circuit that will restrict creative
debtors and creditors from forum shopping for a more advantageous
result. " 4 Because the goal behind enacting bankruptcy laws is uni-
formity, non-uniform applications of bankruptcy statutes defy the
constitutional mandate.'
The continued existence of the property of the estate post-
confirmation also means that post-petition creditors may take priority
over other unsecured creditors in the payment of debts. In other
words, as exemplified by the Neiman case, because the post-petition
creditors' claims were considered to be administrative expenses in-
curred to preserve the estate, the claims had priority over Security
Bank's claim on the unsecured debt."16
108. Id. at 691.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (1988).
110. 1 F.3d at 691. In addition, 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1988), provides that
except as otherwise provided in the plan, the confirmation of the plan discharges
the debtor from debts which arose before the confirmation date.
111. 1 F.3d at 691.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Hardy, supra note 1, at 1105.
115. Hardy, supra note 1, at 1105.
116. See 1 F.3d at 691. Although the post-petition claim in this case took priority
over the unsecured claim of Security Bank, it only did so because it was considered
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Resolving this issue in favor of the continuance of the estate
post-confirmation may also provide for conflicting results. Although
post-petition creditors may be willing to lend funds to the debtors
post-confirmation, they will probably only do so to the extent these
funds are for preserving the estate and, therefore, considered ad-
ministrative expenses. It is unlikely that creditors will otherwise be
willing to provide credit post-confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan
however, since all of the protection afforded under the title, namely
the automatic stay, will still be available to the debtor post-confir-
mation. This may impair the debtor's ability to meet the plan
requirements and may eventually lead to a conversion of the case."
7
This decision may be significant in one other respect. The
significance arises when a Chapter 13 case is converted into a Chapter
7 case." 8 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the date of
conversion rule to establish what property is included under the
Chapter 7 estate upon conversion."19 Under this rule, the Chapter
7 estate constitutes all of the debtor's interest in property at the
time of conversion. 20 This rule is in conflict with the position that
the Chapter 13 estate continues to exist post-confirmation because,
in the event of conversion, this Chapter 13 estate would not be
included in the Chapter 7 estate.'2 ' These two conflicting positions
can only be reconciled by providing that the debtor has an interest
in the Chapter 13 estate on the date of conversion.'2
to be a claim for administrative expenses. The administrative expenses were incurred
to preserve the estate and, therefore, took priority pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§§ 503(b)(l)(A) and 507(a)(1). Unless a claim that arises post-confirmation qualifies
as an administrative expense, it will become, along with a pre-petition claim, a
dischargeable obligation in the event the case is converted. White, supra note 6,
at 798.
117. Vaska, supra note 68, at 684.
118. White, supra note 6, at 798. The article provides an excellent discussion
of the problems in determining the scope of property of the estate in connection
with the conversion of a Chapter 13 case into a Chapter 7 case.
119. White, supra note 6, at 821 (citing In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087, 1090-
91 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984); Resendez v. Lindquist, 691
F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1982)).
120. White, supra note 6, at 834. The estate, upon conversion to a Chapter 7
proceeding, will include any property the debtor has an interest in at the time the
conversion takes place. The assets under the Chapter 7 estate will then be available
for distribution to pre-petition and post-petition creditors. White, supra note 6, at
822.
121. White, supra note 6, at 835. The date of conversion approach to estate
property under a Chapter 7 proceeding includes all of the property in which the
debtor has an interest. If the confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan, prior to
conversion, does not affect the property of the Chapter 13 estate, the debtor cannot
be said to have an interest in such property.




Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has resolved the
issue of whether the estate continues to exist post-confirmation, there
is still a wide split of authority regarding this issue among other
jurisdictions, and therefore, results are still unpredictable in other
courts. 23 Whether other courts will choose to follow the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision or one of the other two alternatives
will determine whether the application of the bankruptcy statutes
provides more or less uniformity among the jurisdictions. This may
lead to reform by Congress or a final decision by the Supreme
Court. The application of the Neiman decision in the future will
also reveal its full impact and significance under the Bankruptcy
Code.
Alexandra A. Ifrah
does not include the property of the estate under the Chapter 13 proceeding, such
property may not be included in the Chapter 7 estate and will not be available
for distribution to creditors.
123. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is the only circuit court that has
considered this issue. Until Neiman, the split of authority existed primarily among
district and bankruptcy courts.
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